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One of the most commonly cited obstacles to cost recovery tariffs is the problem of affordability 
of basic utility services by residential households, and low income families in particular. 
However, a careful analysis of income distribution in the region suggests that only about 20% of 
Latin American households would have to pay more than 5% of their income for water or 
electricity services if tariffs were set at cost recovery levels. However, in the region’s lower 
income countries (Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay), reaching cost recovery tariffs would 
represent a significant affordability problem for around half of the population. Even in cases 
where tariffs might have to double to reach cost recovery levels, the overall impact on poverty 
levels in Latin America would be negligible. These results can be compared to those for India and 
Africa where around 70% of households could be expected to face difficulties in paying full cost 
recovery tariffs. In these regions, tariffs would likely have to increase by a factor of ten to reach 
cost recovery levels, and this could be expected to have a significant  
impact on poverty. 
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There are only two possible ways of paying for infrastructure services: through fiscal 
transfers financed by tax payers, or through user charges financed by consumers.  
Moreover, the participation of the private sector does not materially alter this underlying 
reality, since finance raised in private capital markets must ultimately be remunerated 
either through fiscal transfers or user charges.  
 
This paper focuses on user charges as a mechanism for infrastructure financing. For some 
components of infrastructure with strong public good characteristics⎯for example rural 
roads⎯user charges are not a feasible option. For other components of infrastructure 
⎯notably telecommunications⎯full cost recovery through user charges is not only 
feasible but has widely become the norm in Latin America and hence does not warrant 
any major comment. This chapter focuses on two major areas of infrastructure⎯water 
and electricity⎯where cost recovery is technically feasible and economically attractive 
but may be politically difficult to achieve. 
 
During the 1990s, the majority of countries in Latin America passed sector reform 
legislation espousing principles of cost recovery for water and electricity services. Cost 
recovery was a key prerequisite for reducing the fiscal burden associated with these 
sectors, and opening the doors to private sector participation. However, ten years later, it 
is apparent that the transition to cost recovery pricing has been much more challenging 
than originally supposed.  
 
Despite substantial efforts to raise tariffs in nominal local currency terms, a large part of 
these gains have been wiped out by price inflation and currency devaluation. 
Nevertheless, Latin American utility tariffs are currently the highest of any developing 
region and above the average for upper middle income countries. Analysis of household 
income distribution shows that, except in a handful of the poorest countries, only a small 
segment of the population in Latin America (around 20%) faces genuine affordability 
problems in paying cost recovery tariffs, far fewer than in other developing regions.  As a 
result, there is considerable potential for targeted subsidies to reconcile cost recovery and 
social protection objectives. Nevertheless, the increasing block tariff structures, which are 
the region’s most prevalent form of social policy, tend to be poorly designed failing to 
make a significant contribution in this direction. 
 
This paper begins by evaluating to what extent Latin American water and electricity 
utilities have advanced towards the cost recovery goal during the last decade, comparing 
them where possible to their peers in other regions of the world. It goes on to consider 
why cost recovery has proved to be such an elusive goal, focusing on the problem of 
affordability among low income households. Finally, it considers to what extent  Latin 
American countries have succeeded in establishing effective safety nets for water and 
electricity services that might allow some reconciliation between the goals of cost 
recovery and social protection. 
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2.  The Goal of Cost Recovery 
 
The discussion begins by evaluating to what extent Latin American electricity and water 
utilities succeeded in advancing towards the cost recovery goal enshrined in the new 
regulatory frameworks of the 1990s. In order to put the achievements in perspective, 
benchmark comparisons against other regions will be performed wherever data permits. 
 
The ideal methodology for measuring cost recovery would be to take the average tariff 
for each utility and compare it against the full average cost of production for that 
particular utility. Unfortunately, there is very little public information available about the 
full average cost of service provision, making this approach almost impossible to apply 
on a regional scale. Instead a simpler approach is taken, establishing indicative ranges 
within which tariffs would need to fall in order to have a high probability of recovering 
either operation and maintenance costs or full capital costs. These ranges are based on  
expert estimates.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that this methodology does not enable us to say with 
precision when a particular utility is achieving full cost recovery. However, it does enable 
us to identify utilities that are not achieving full cost recovery. Moreover, it allows us to 
classify utilities into three broad groups. In the first group are utilities whose tariffs are so 
low that they are extremely unlikely to be meeting even operation and maintenance costs. 
In the second group are utilities whose tariffs are at a level that is likely to be 
commensurate with operation and maintenance costs, but is extremely unlikely to leave 
over any significant contribution towards capital costs. In the third group are utilities 
whose tariffs are high enough to be making a significant contribution towards capital 





The water sector in Latin America has become highly decentralized during the last two 
decades and information on tariffs in smaller cities is very limited. The analysis is 
therefore based on tariff data from around 15 utilities serving the region’s larger cities for 
the period 1997 to 2003 (ADERASA, forthcoming). The group also includes one or two 
national level utilities serving smaller countries, such as Costa Rica and Uruguay. Given 
that tariff levels in larger cities tend to be higher than those in smaller cities, the true 
status of cost recovery is likely to be significantly worse than what can be portrayed 
through this analysis. 
 
Local currency tariff trends provide a good indication of the degree of ‘effort’ that 
different utilities made to raise their tariffs towards cost recovery levels. The results show 
that 13 Latin American water utilities raised their residential tariffs in nominal terms at an 
average annual rate of 8% over the period 1997/03 (Figure 1). Nevertheless, these gains 
were largely wiped out by inflation, with real residential tariffs rising by less than 1% per 
year on average over the same period. In the case of industrial customers, water tariffs 
rose in nominal terms at an average annual rate of 4% over the period 1997/03. However,   4
in real terms, this translated into an average annual decline of 3% over the same period. 
The lower growth rates observed for industrial tariffs relative to residential tariffs reflect 
a tendency to try and reduce the large divergence between tariffs paid by these two 
customer groups, given that industrial tariffs in Latin America tend to be two or three 
times as high as residential tariffs. Details of the Colombian experience with raising 
water tariffs are documented in Box 1. 
 
Figure 1: Average annual change in water tariffs 1997/03 



















































































































































Box 1: Colombian experience with raising residential water tariffs 
In 1994, Colombia passed the Public Services Law requiring reference utility tariffs to rise to full cost 
recovery levels. The law also limited the extent of cross-subsidies between customers, so that poor 
households should always pay at least 50% of the full cost of the service, while better off households 
should pay no more than 20% over and above the full cost of service in order to finance cross-subsidies to 
poor households. A two year deadline was established for the completion of this tariff rebalancing. 
 
However, the magnitude of the tariff increases required to meet these legal goals was extremely large, and 
moreover regressively distributed.  An increase of 50% was required to bring the reference tariff in line 
with full cost recovery. Furthermore, due to the fact that cross-subsidies were historically much larger than 
those prescribed by law, the tariffs of the poorest households would have had to rise by 400% in real terms. 
Given the social and  political difficulties entailed, the legal deadline was twice extended, first by five years 
(from 1996 to 2001 by Law 286/96) and then by a further four years (from 2001 to 2005 by Law 632/01). 
In the meantime, the requirement for poor households to pay at least 50% of the full cost of service 
provision was reduced to 30% of full cost. Ten years after the reform law, reference tariffs have now 
reached cost recovery levels. However, higher income consumers continue to pay surcharges of 30-60% on 
their bills in order to compensate for the large subsidies still applied to lower income groups. 
 
Owing to the broad definition of low income groups used in the Colombian tariff system, about 80% of 
residential customers qualify as eligible to benefit from cross-subsidies. Thus, notwithstanding the progress 
made towards the tariff objectives established in the 1994 Public Services Law, the water sector continues 
to make substantial fiscal demands. The Colombian government transferred an average of US$240 million 
per year to municipally operated water utilities over the period 1998/01, which accounted for 80% of the 
resources available for investment in the sector. 
 
Source: Adapted from Colombia Recent Economic Developments in Infrastructure, World Bank 2004 
 
 
Given these tendencies, to what extent do current water tariffs succeed in covering the 
full costs of service provision? The direct evidence is limited. A recent survey of water 
tariffs conducted by regulatory agencies in Latin America concluded that residential 
tariffs in 10 large cities on average fall short of full cost recovery by around 30%, while 
industrial tariffs may exceed cost recovery levels by around 20% (ADERASA, 
forthcoming). In the case of Asia, a recent review of water tariffs in 18 large cities reports 
that only half of them are high enough to cover full operating and maintenance costs 
(ADB, 2004). 
 
Thus, in order to provide a broader evaluation of cost recovery, the analysis will refer to  
indicative ranges within which tariffs would need to fall in order to have a high 
probability of recovering either operation and maintenance costs or full capital costs. The 
ranges are taken from GWI 2004 and summarized in Table 1 below. They are broadly 
consistent with estimates of a global reference price for water made by Kingdom, Van 
Ginneken and Brocklehurst (forthcoming). These authors set a reference value of 
US$0.30 per cubic meter for operation and maintenance costs, and a reference value of 
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Table 1: Thresholds used for evaluating cost recovery of water tariffs 
 Developing  countries  Industrialized  countries 
<US$0.20/m  Tariff  insufficient to cover basic operating 
and maintenance costs 
 
Tariff  insufficient to cover basic 
operating and maintenance costs. 
US$0.20-0.40/m
3 Tariff  sufficient to cover operating and 
some maintenance costs 
 
Tariff  insufficient to cover basic 
operating and maintenance costs. 
US$0.40-1.00/m
3 Tariff  sufficient to cover operating, 
maintenance and most investment needs 
 
Tariff  sufficient to cover operating and 
maintenance costs 
>US$1.00/m
3 Tariff  sufficient to cover operating, 
maintenance and most investment needs 
in the face of extreme supply shortages 
 
Tariff  sufficient to cover full cost of 
modern water systems in most high-
income cities 
Source: GWI, 2004 
 
Based on this framework, it is possible to assess the progress actually made towards cost 
recovery over this period by expressing tariffs in US dollar terms and comparing them 
against these benchmarks (Table 2)
1. The average real residential water tariff in the 13 
Latin American cities considered rose from US$0.47 to US$0.51 per cubic meter. 
However, this result is driven by some particularly large tariff increases in Colombia 
(recall Box 1), so that the median tariff actually fell from US$0.51 to US$0.38 per cubic 
meter. As a result, the percentage of utilities within the indicative range for some degree 
of capital cost recovery fell from 62% to 46%. However, the number of utilities whose 
tariffs do not even cover operation and maintenance expenditures fell from 8% of the 
sample to 0%. The average real industrial tariff fell substantially from US$1.91 to 
US$1.11 over the period 1997/03. Nevertheless, industrial tariffs in 1997 were so far 
above cost recovery levels that even a decline of this magnitude did not bring them below 
the threshold for full capital cost recovery in any of the utilities considered. 
 
                                                 
1 The real tariff trends reported in LCU in Figure 1 do not necessarily coincide with the real tariff trends 
reported in US$ terms in Table 2. The differences are due to the fact that some countries experienced a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate against the US$, while others experienced an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate against the US$ over the same period. A more extensive explanation of this issue is provided 
in Appendix 1.   7
Table 2: Real water tariff trends in 13 Latin American cities 
Residential Industrial   
1997 2003  1997  2003 
Average tariffs (US$/m3)        
Arequipa 0.38  0.22  1.29  0.69 
Bogota 0.63  1.16  1.76  1.58 
Cali 0.58  0.76  1.99  1.47 
Cochabamba 0.43  0.32  1.29  0.83 
Costa Rica  0.54  0.34  4.54  1.80 
La Paz  0.24  0.22  1.52  1.19 
Lima 0.38  0.32  1.29  0.93 
Managua 0.21  0.31  1.37  0.57 
Medellin 0.65  0.78  1.84  1.22 
Pernambuco 0.67  0.51  3.89  1.35 
Santa Cruz  0.65  0.59  0.94  0.74 
Trujillo 0.51  0.38  1.21  1.02 
Uruguay 0.19  0.72  1.24  1.11 
        
Average 0.47  0.51  1.91  1.11 
Median 0.51  0.38  1.44  1.11 
Minimum 0.19  0.22  0.94  0.57 
Maximum 0.67  1.16  4.54  1.80 
        
Cost recovery (% cases)        
Partial capital costs  62  46  100  100 
Partial O&M costs  31  54  0  0 
Nil 8  0  0  0 
        
Source: Adapted from ADERASA, forthcoming and GWI 2004 
 
It is interesting to see how water tariffs in Latin America currently compare with those in 
other regions (Table 3). The comparisons are based on a sample of 132 water utilities 
serving major cities worldwide.  
 
Average residential water tariffs in OECD countries currently stand at US$1.04 per cubic 
meter. However, even in OECD countries, only around half of water utilities have tariffs 
high enough to make a substantial contribution to capital costs. Among developing 
regions of the world, Latin America has the strongest record on cost recovery. The results 
show that water tariffs in Latin America are on average about 40% of those observed in 
OECD countries, although given higher costs of service provision in OECD countries the 
percentage of utilities whose tariffs make some contribution to capital costs is quite 
similar to that in Latin America. Latin America has the highest prices of any developing 
region of the world, with median water tariffs twice as high as those observed in East 
Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, and more than six times as high as those 
observed in South Asia
2. 
 
                                                 
2 The average tariffs reported for Latin America in Tables 2 and 3 differ somewhat owing to the use of a 
different sample. The data in Table 2 are based on a sample of 13 water utilities for which tariff trends over 
time are available. The data in Table 3 are based on a sample of 23 water utilities for which only the most 
recent tariff is available.   8
In general, there is a strong relationship between cost recovery and the income level of 
the country. Overall, the correlation coefficient between water tariffs and per capita GDP 
stands at 0.39. Average tariffs rise from around US$0.10 per cubic meter in low-income 
countries, to US$0.30 per cubic meter in middle-income countries and US$1.00 per cubic 
meter in high-income countries.  The percentage of utilities whose tariffs make some 
significant contribution to covering capital costs rises correspondingly from less than 5% 
in low-income countries to around 30% in middle-income countries, and 50% in high-
income countries. In this context, it is striking that the performance of Latin America is 
substantially better than that of the group of upper-middle-income countries as a whole. 
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Global  0.53 0.35 0.50  0.00  1.97  0.13  0.85  39  30  30 
                   
By income                   
HIC  1.00 0.96 0.45  0.00  1.97  0.60  1.37  8  42  50 
UMIC 0.34 0.35 0.24  0.03  0.81  0.15  0.57  39  22  39 
LMIC 0.31 0.22 0.19  0.04  0.85  0.19  0.39  37  41  22 
LIC  0.11 0.09 0.09  0.01  0.45  0.05  0.16  89  9 3 
                   
By region                   
OECD 1.04 1.00 0.45  0.00  1.97  0.70  1.37  6  43  51 
LAC  0.41 0.39 0.19  0.12  0.81  0.22  0.54  13  39  48 
MENA  0.37 0.15 0.39  0.03  1.17  0.03  0.60  58  25  17 
EAP  0.25 0.20 0.13  0.04  0.53  0.18  0.30  53  32  16 
ECA  0.13 0.16 0.07  0.01  0.20  0.08  0.17  100  0 0 
SAS  0.09 0.06 0.05  0.02  0.22  0.05  0.12  100  0 0 
                   
Sources: ADB, 2001; ADERASA, 2003; GWI, 2004; NIUA, 1999 
Notes: Average tariffs are based on residential consumption of 15 cubic meters 
Data drawn from utilities serving 132 major cities worldwide, broken down as follows:  
OECD (47), SAS (24), LAC (23), EAP (19), MENA(12), ECA(6). 
 
In summary, water tariffs in Latin America’s larger water utilities have not risen 
substantially on average over the period 1997/03, although some individual operators 
have made substantial efforts to increase prices towards cost recovery levels. As a result, 
the percentage of water utilities whose tariffs make a significant contribution to capital 
costs has declined slightly. However, at the other end of the spectrum, all of the utilities 
considered had managed to reach tariff levels commensurate with the recovery of 
operation and maintenance expenditures. As things currently stand, Latin America has 
the highest water tariffs of any developing region. At US$0.41 per cubic meter they are 
still only 40% of those applied in OECD countries; however given the higher cost levels 
faced by industrialized countries the percentage of utilities whose tariffs make a 
substantial contribution to capital costs is not so dissimilar. Finally, it is important to 
recall that the results presented here over-state the true extent of cost recovery to the 
extent that they are based on data from utilities serving major cities that tend to also be 




The information base on electricity tariffs is much more extensive than that available for 
the case of water. The analysis draws on the regional database developed by OLADE 
(2004) that provides average tariffs at the country level for different customer classes. As 
a result, it is possible to draw a more comprehensive picture as to the current extent of 
cost recovery for electricity. 
 
The results show that 13 Latin American electric utilities made substantial efforts to raise 
their residential tariffs in nominal terms at an average annual rate of 22% over the period 
1990/02 (Figure 2). Nevertheless, these gains were largely wiped out by inflation, with 
real residential tariffs rising by no more than 2% per year on average over the same 
period. In the case of industrial customers, electricity tariffs rose in nominal terms at an 
average annual rate of 18% over the period 1997/03. However, in real terms, this 
translated into an average annual decline of 1% over the same period. In contrast to the 
water sector, industrial electricity tariffs tend to be lower than residential tariffs.  
 
It is interesting to compare tariff trends in Latin America with those observed in other 
regions of the world (Figure 3). Looking at the period 1995/00, for which comparable 
data is available, South Asia, Eurasia and East Asia sustained much larger real tariff 
increases than Latin America of between 4-9% per year in local currency terms. 
However, real residential electricity tariffs in OECD countries declined in real terms over 
the same period. Notwithstanding these differences in trend, residential electricity tariffs 
in Latin America remain the highest of any developing region in absolute terms, although 
they still fall substantially short of those in OECD countries (Figure 4). 
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Figure 2: Average annual change in residential electricity tariffs in Latin America 1990/02 
Source: OLADE, 2004 
 
 
Figure 3: Real average annual increase in local currency residential electricity 
tariffs by region 1995/00 
Sources: OECD 2004, ERRA 2004, EIA 2004, OLADE 2004, UN-ESCAP 2004. 
Notes: Data drawn from 84 countries worldwide, broken down as follows OECD 















































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Comparative regional trends in residential electricity tariffs 1994/02 
Sources: OECD 2004, ERRA 2004, EIA 2004, OLADE 2004, UN-ESCAP 2004. 
Notes: Data drawn from 84 countries worldwide, broken down as follows OECD 
(23), LAC (19), ECA(18), EAP (8), SAS (3) 
 
 
In order to provide a broader evaluation of cost recovery, the analysis will refer to a  
number of indicative ranges within which tariffs would need to fall in order to have a 
high probability of recovering either operation and maintenance costs or full capital costs. 
These ranges are based on discussion with international experts on electricity tariffs 
summarized in Table 4 below. Different thresholds are provided for residential and 
industrial customers to reflect the lower cost of service provision to the latter group. 
 
Table 4: Thresholds used for evaluating cost recovery of electricity tariffs 
  Residential customers  Industrial customers 
<US$0.04/kWh Tariff  insufficient to cover basic 
operating and maintenance costs 
 
Tariff  insufficient to cover basic 
operating and maintenance costs. 
>US$0.05/kWh    Tariffs likely to be making a significant 
contribution towards capital costs, in 
most types of systems. 
>US$0.08/kWh  Tariffs likely to be making a significant 
contribution towards capital costs, in 
most types of systems. 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
Based on this framework, it is possible to assess the evolution in the absolute value of the 
average residential electricity tariff expressed in dollar terms. The average residential 
electricity tariff in the 19 Latin American countries considered rose from US$0.07 to 
US$0.10 per kilowatt-hour between 1990/96, falling back down to US$0.09 per kilowatt-
hour by 2002. Correspondingly, the percentage of countries recovering some degree of 

































































However, the percentage of countries offering residential electricity service at tariffs 
lower than operating and maintenance cost fell from 16% to 0% over the entire period. 
 
Industrial tariffs tend to be slightly lower than residential tariffs, but follow a similar 
pattern of evolution. Thus, average residential electricity tariffs in the 19 Latin American 
countries considered rose from US$0.07 to US$0.09 per kilowatt-hour between 1990/96, 
and back down to US$0.07 per kilowatt-hour by 2002. Correspondingly, the percentage 
of countries recovering some degree of capital costs rose from 74% to 89% between 
1990/96, falling down to 68% by 2002. Furthermore, the percentage of countries offering 
industrial electricity service at tariffs lower than operating and maintenance cost rose 
from 5% to 16% over the entire period. 
 
Table 5: Real electricity tariff trends in 19 Latin American countries 
Residential Industrial  US$/kWh 
1990 1996 2002  1990  1996 2002 
Average tariffs           
Argentina  0.09 0.12 0.04  0.09  0.09 0.02 
Bolivia  0.07 0.08 0.06  0.07  0.09 0.04 
Brazil  0.08 0.15 0.08  0.06  0.06 0.04 
Chile  0.14 0.15 0.08  0.08  0.08 0.06 
Colombia  0.04 0.05 0.07  0.07  0.10 0.06 
Costa  Rica  0.06 0.08 0.06  0.08  0.11 0.07 
Dominican  Republic  0.07 0.11 0.10  0.11  0.13 0.10 
Ecuador  0.02 0.03 0.09  0.04  0.06 0.08 
El  Salvador  0.04 0.09 0.09  0.04  0.12 0.11 
Guatemala  0.05 0.08 0.08  0.07  0.11 0.07 
Honduras  0.07 0.07 0.07  0.05  0.10 0.06 
Jamaica  0.18 0.15 0.16  0.12  0.12 0.11 
México  0.06 0.05 0.08  0.06  0.04 0.06 
Nicaragua  0.06 0.12 0.13  0.07  0.11 0.11 
Panama  0.16 0.13 0.12  0.14  0.11 0.10 
Paraguay  0.06 0.07 0.05  0.04  0.06 0.03 
Peru  0.02 0.16 0.11  0.08  0.06 0.07 
Uruguay  0.11 0.17 0.10  0.08  0.09 0.05 
Venezuela  0.02 0.02 0.06  0.02  0.02 0.03 
          
Average  0.07 0.10 0.09  0.07  0.09 0.07 
Median  0.06 0.09 0.08  0.07  0.09 0.06 
Minimum  0.02 0.02 0.04  0.02  0.02 0.02 
Maximum  0.18 0.16 0.16  0.14  0.13 0.11 
          
Cost recovery (%)          
Partial  capital  costs  32 68 63  74  89 68 
Partial O&M costs  52  21  37  21  6  16 
Nil  16 11 0  5  5  16 
          
Source: OLADE, 2004 
 
Once again, it is interesting to see how current electricity tariffs in Latin America   
compare with those in other regions (Table 6). The comparisons are based on average 
national tariff data for a sample of 83 countries.  
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Average residential electricity tariffs in OECD countries currently stand at US$0.12 per 
kilowatt-hour, so that more than 80% of OECD countries have residential tariffs high 
enough to make a significant contribution towards capital costs. As in the case of water, 
Latin America has the strongest record on cost recovery of any of the developing regions, 
with average residential tariffs at US$0.09 per kilowatt-hour and just over half of 
countries practicing residential tariffs that make a significant contribution to the recovery 
of capital costs. These tariffs are about 50% higher than those observed in other 
developing regions that typically lie in the US$0.04-0.06 per kilowatt-hour range. 
 
As before, there is a strong relationship between cost recovery and the income level of 
the country. Average tariffs rise from around US$0.05 per kilowatt-hour in low-income 
countries, to US$0.06-0.07 per kilowatt-hour in middle-income countries and US$0.12 
per kilowatt-hour in high-income countries. The percentage of utilities whose tariffs 
make some significant contribution to covering capital costs rises correspondingly from 
around 25% in low-income countries to around 30% in middle-income countries, and 
80% in high-income countries. Once again, it is striking to note that Latin America’s 
performance on cost recovery is above the average for upper-middle-income countries. 
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Global  0.08 0.07 0.04  0.01  0.21  0.05  0.10  15  44  41 
                   
By income                   
HIC  0.12 0.11 0.04  0.06  0.21  0.09  0.13  0  17  83 
UMIC 0.07 0.06 0.03  0.04  0.14  0.05  0.09  0  71  29 
LMIC 0.06 0.05 0.03  0.03  0.14  0.04  0.08  27  50  23 
LIC  0.05 0.05 0.03  0.01  0.13  0.04  0.06  31  44  25 
                   
By region                   
OECD 0.12 0.11 0.04  0.06  0.21  0.09  0.13  0  17  83 
LAC  0.09 0.09 0.03  0.05  0.14  0.06  0.10  0  47  53 
ECA  0.06 0.04 0.03  0.02  0.14  0.04  0.08  31  38  31 
EAP  0.05 0.05 0.02  0.01  0.08  0.04  0.06  29  65  6 
SSA  0.05 0.06 0.02  0.03  0.08  0.04  0.06  29  71  0 
SAS  0.04 0.04 0.01  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.05  33  67  0 
                   
 
Sources: OECD 2004, ERRA 2004, EIA 2004, OLADE 2004, Estache and Gassner 2004, UN-ESCAP 
2004. 
Notes: Data drawn from 84 countries worldwide, broken down as follows OECD (23), LAC (19), ECA(18), 
SSA(13), EAP (8), SAS (3) 
 
Comparing the results presented in Table 6 for electricity, with those presented in Table 3 
for water, it is evident that⎯while the same general patterns hold⎯the absolute extent of 
cost recovery is far higher for electricity services across the income spectrum. Thus, 
while 85% of countries (and 69% of low-income countries) achieve some degree of cost 
recovery for electricity, only 60% of utilities (and 12% of low-income utilities) achieve 
some degree of cost recovery for water. Moreover, average tariffs for electricity in high-  14
income countries are around twice as high as those in low-income countries, while 
average tariffs for water in high-income countries are around nine times as high as those 
in low-income countries. 
 
In summary, residential electricity tariffs in Latin America have not risen very 
substantially on average over the period 1990/02; tariff increases tended to be more 
pronounced in the period 1990/96 followed by a subsequent decline. Overall, these 
increases have been more modest than those observed in other developing regions. 
Nonetheless, the percentage of power utilities whose tariffs make a significant 
contribution to capital costs has virtually doubled over the decade, although it is still less 
than two thirds of the total. Moreover, the percentage of utilities whose tariffs do not 
even cover operating and maintenance costs has also fallen substantially. In addition, 
Latin America has the highest average residential electricity tariffs of any developing 
region, exceeding that of upper-middle-income countries as a whole. However, at 
US$0.09 per kilowatt-hour they are still only 75% of those applied in OECD countries, 
and the extent of cost recovery also lags behind that observed in industrialized countries.  
 
 
3.  The Problem of Affordability 
 
One of the most common reasons cited for the difficulty in reaching cost recovery tariffs 
for water and electricity services is the problem of affordability among residential 
customers, and low income households particularly. Nevertheless, the concept of 
affordability is seldom rigorously defined, nor is it often evaluated in empirical terms.  
 
The purpose of this section is to estimate what percentage of the population may 
experience genuine problems of affordability for water and electricity services when 
these are charged at cost recovery prices. In order to make this assessment, the cost of 
purchasing a subsistence allowance of water and electricity services is estimated both at 
current tariff levels and at cost recovery benchmark levels.  
 
Given the variations that exist in subsistence consumption, depending on climatic 
conditions and cultural norms, both an upper and lower bound estimate are given. In the 
case of water, the lower bound is based on a consumption level of around 50 liters per 
capita per day for a household of five, which according to the World Health Organization 
is around the minimum needed for basic hygiene. The upper bound is based on a 
consumption level of around 100 liters per capita per day for a household of five and is a 
more typical level of modest use in urbanized settings. In the case of electricity, the lower 
bound is based on a household with a few light bulbs and a small radio, while the upper 
bound is based on a household with a few light bulbs, plus a modest refrigerator and a 
small television. 
 
Notwithstanding the width of these ranges, the bottom line is that households will require 
a sum of the order of US$4-13 per month in order to meet their basic needs for each of 
these services (Table 7).   15
 
Table 7: Reference level for cost of subsistence consumption (US$/m) 
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In order to understand how much of a burden such charges might represent, data are 
collected on the distribution of income in 32 countries (19 from Latin America, 8 from 
Africa, and 4 from East Asia, plus India). Interest focuses on the distribution of 
household income, rather than the distribution of personal income as is more typically 
studied, because household income is the relevant budgetary constraint for utility 
services. Due to constraints in data availability household income data are used for India 
and Latin America, while household expenditure data are used for Africa and East Asia. 
In general, expenditure is thought to be a more reliable indicator of household welfare 
than income. Given that expenditure is known to be more equitably distributed than 
income, statistics based on income may tend to over-state the affordability problem faced 
by low income households relative to statistics based on expenditure. 
 
The data are used to calculate average household income (expenditure) at each level of 
the income (expenditure) distribution, which can then be compared against the cost 
recovery benchmark for utility prices in order to determine the extent to which these are 
affordable. The analysis focuses entirely on the urban income distribution, since utility 
services are mainly prevalent in urban areas. The methodology used to calculate average 
household income (expenditure) in comparable dollar terms across countries is described 
in greater detail in Appendix 2.  
 
The analysis is repeated both in US dollar and international dollar terms reflecting 
purchasing power parity. The former is more appropriate to the extent that water and 
utility services are regarded as traded goods, while the latter is more appropriate to the 
extent that they are regarded as non-tradable goods. In reality, the cost structure of 
electricity and water services comprises both tradable and non-tradable components. In 
practice, the exact balance between the two is likely to depend on the size and income 
level of the country. Large middle-income countries may have the capacity to produce 
many of the manufactured inputs for water and electricity services, whereas smaller 
lower-income countries will often need to import them. In addition, other things being 
equal, water services (due to their greater reliance on public works and lesser reliance on 
sophisticated mechanical equipment) would tend to have a lower share of imported items 
in the overall cost structure. In summary, it would appear that water services in large 
middle-income countries are close to being entirely locally produced. On the other hand, 
electricity services in smaller lower-income countries are close to being entirely 
imported. Other cases lie somewhere in between. 
   16
While there is no objective basis for determining whether or not a particular level of 
expenditure on utility services is affordable, the threshold of 5% of income as a 
reasonable limit for expenditure on water is often used in Latin America. Moreover, 
analysis of household survey data suggest that the poorest households rarely spend more 
than 5% of income on water (Figure 5). In the case of electricity, there is no comparable 
threshold in widespread usage, however analysis of household survey data suggest that 
poor households rarely spend more than 6-8% of income on electricity (Figure 6). 
 

















Source: Own elaboration from LSMS household survey data 
 
Figure 6: Household survey evidence on electricity expenditure by quintile 










































































































5th quintile  17
On this basis, it is possible to calculate the percentage of the urban population within 
each Latin American country that would need to spend more than 5% of their income in 
order to purchase a subsistence block of water or electricity at different cost levels in 
current US$ terms (Figure 7a). The results show a wide dispersion of outcomes across 
countries. In low-income countries⎯such as Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua⎯utility 
bills of around US$10 per month already represent a substantial burden for 30-50% of 
urban households. In lower-middle-income countries⎯such as Argentina, Brazil and 
Colombia⎯utility bills of around US$15 per month start to represent an affordability 
problem for around 30% of urban  households. Finally, in upper-middle-income 
countries⎯such as Mexico and Venezuela⎯less than 10% of the population would 
appear to face genuine problems of affordability at any of the levels considered. 
However, when the same exercise is repeated in PPP terms, utility bills in the range 
US$10-15 per month appear to be affordable for the vast majority of the population in all 
of the countries considered (Figure 7b) 
 
A similar exercise is performed considering what percentage of the average income level 
of each quintile of the regional income distribution would be absorbed when utility bills 
are set at a variety of levels (Figures 8a,b). The results show that when bills are expressed 
in current US$ terms, affordability problems are confined only to the first quintile of the 
regional income distribution once utility bills exceed the US$10 per month threshold. 
However, when bills are expressed in PPP terms, there do not appear to be major 
affordability problems, even for households in the first income quintile. 
 
It is interesting to compare the situation in Latin America with that of other regions with 
greater prevalence of poverty (Figures 9a,b). Once again, this is done by calculating the 
percentage of urban households that would need to spend more than 5% of income 
(expenditure) on utilities if bills were set at a range of different levels. When expressed in 
current US$ terms, the results show that the affordability problem is very much more 
severe in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa than in Latin America. Whereas only 10% of 
Latin American  households would face affordability problems with utility bills at US$10 
per month, around 35% of East Asian households and 55% of Indian and African 
households would face affordability problems at the same reference level of utility bills. 
Nevertheless, when the same exercise is repeated in PPP terms, the extent of the 
affordability problem is reduced and the divergences between regions attenuated. Thus, 
even monthly utility bills approaching US$20 in PPP terms would only create problems 
for the bottom quintile of the distribution in Asia and Africa. 
 
Clearly the extent to which the cost of providing utility services is predominantly driven 
by local or international costs makes a huge difference to the conclusions regarding the 
affordability of utility services. In Latin American countries, where the provision of 
utility services is largely driven by local costs, there does not appear to be a major 
affordability problem. However, in countries where the cost structure is largely 
international, there does appear to be a significant affordability issue affecting the bottom 
30-50% of the urban income distribution. In either case, affordability problems in Latin 
America are much more limited compared to those found in other regions of the world 
with greater prevalence of poverty.   18
Figure 7a: Urban households facing affordability problems by country (current 
US$) 
Source: Own elaboration from LSMS household survey data 
 
Figure 7b: Urban households facing affordability problems by country (PPP) 
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Figure 8a: Income share on subsistence consumption by LAC urban quintiles 
(current US$) 
Source: Own elaboration from LSMS household survey data 
 
Figure 8b: Income share on subsistence consumption by LAC urban quintiles (PPP)  
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Quintile 5  20
Figure 9a: Urban households facing affordability problems by region (current US$) 
Source: Own elaboration from LSMS household survey data 
Note: Data from India and Latin America are based on household income, while 
data on Africa and East Asia are based on household expenditure, as a result the 
two groups are not directly comparable. 
 
Figure 9b: Urban households facing affordability problems by region (PPP) 
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Note: Data from India and Latin America are based on household income, while data on Africa and East 
Asia are based on household expenditure, as a result the two groups are not directly comparable. 
A final way to look at this issue is to estimate the impact of increasing service tariffs 
towards cost recovery levels on the incidence of poverty. By raising the cost of meeting 
an essential service, such tariff increases would effectively reduce the real income of the 
population, thereby bringing more people under the poverty line, or deepening the 
poverty of those already under the poverty line. 
 
A number of scenarios are considered for increasing utility bills. The first scenario raises 
the monthly bill from US$3 to US$6 per month, the second scenario raises the monthly 
bill from US$6 to US$12 per month, while the third scenario raises the monthly bill from 
US$1 to US$12 per month. The first two scenarios correspond to the kind of tariff 
increases that might be required in Latin America (recall Table 7). The third scenario is 
more relevant to some low-income countries that would need to raise utility bills by an 
order of magnitude in order to reach cost recovery levels (recall Tables 3 and 6). 
 
In each of these cases, the data on household income (expenditure) distribution is used to 
calculate the percentage increase in three poverty measures: the headcount ratio (HC), 
which measures the percentage of the population under the poverty line; the poverty gap 
(PG), which measures the average percentage deviation of the income (expenditure) of 
those under the poverty line from the level represented by the poverty line; and the FGT 
index, which measures the average squared percentage deviation of the income 
(expenditure) of those under the poverty line from the level represented by the poverty 
line. In all cases, an ordinal poverty line is used, and is determined at the income (or 
expenditure) level of the 40
th percentile of the income (expenditure) distribution in each 
region prior to the tariff changes. The poverty impact is calculated as though all 
households had access to the service. This is manifestly not the case. However, such a 
calculation is nonetheless valuable in determining whether services would remain 
affordable to newly connecting households at cost recovery prices. Further 
methodological details are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
The results show that doubling utility bills from US$3 to US$6 or US$6 to US$12 does 
not have a major impact on poverty indices across Latin America, Asia or Africa (Table 
8). The exceptions are countries such as Bolivia and Guatemala, where such policies 
could add 2 percentage points to the headcount poverty rate. However, with increases 
from US$1 to US$12 per month, the poverty impact is quite large across all regions, but 
particularly in Asia and Africa. The headcount ratio increases by 2 to 3 percentage points 
in Latin America, 3 to 5 percentage points in Asia, and four to seven percentage points in 
Africa. The poverty gap and FGT indices also increase substantially, particularly in 
Africa. These findings suggest that there is still significant scope for progress towards 
cost recovery in middle-income countries where tariffs are already reasonably high, 
without major impact on poverty. However, in low-income countries starting from very 
low baseline tariffs, the social consequences of any transition towards cost recovery 
would appear to be very large.  
 
In summary, based on a 5% affordability threshold, cost recovery tariffs would represent 
affordability problems only for the poorest 20% of households in Latin America.   22
However, in the region’s lower-income countries (Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay), reaching cost recovery tariffs would represent a significant affordability 
problem for around half of the population. Affordability problems are much more serious 
in India and Africa where around 70% of households could be expected to face 
difficulties in paying full cost recovery tariffs. Nevertheless, the extent of the 
affordability problem reduces substantially when incomes are measured in purchasing 
power parity terms. Finally, raising tariffs to cost recovery levels is not found to have any 
significant impact on the prevalence of poverty in middle-income countries, which have 
already made some progress towards cost recovery. However, in low-income countries 
where tenfold tariff increases may be required to reach cost recovery levels, such a policy 
would have a substantial adverse impact on poverty. 
 
Table 8: Poverty impact of raising tariffs to cost recovery levels 
  From US$3 to US$6  From US$6 to US$12  From US$1 to US$12 
  ΔHC  ΔPG  ΔFGT  ΔHC  ΔPG  ΔFGT  ΔHC  ΔPG  ΔFGT 
Latin America             
Argentina  0.0  0.1 0.1 0.0  0.1 0.1 1.0 1.1 0.8 
Bolivia  2.0  0.3 0.3 2.0  0.4 0.3 2.0 2.9 2.3 
Brazil  0.0  0.1 0.1 0.0  0.1 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.9 
Chile  0.0  0.1 0.1 0.0  0.1 0.1 1.0 0.7 0.5 
Colombia  0.0  0.1 0.1 0.0  0.2 0.1 0.0 1.5 1.2 
Costa Rica  1.0  0.1  0.1  1.0  0.1  0.1  2.0  0.6 0.6 
Dominican  Rep.  1.0  0.1 0.1 1.0  0.2 0.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 
Ecuador 1.0  0.2  0.2  1.0  0.2  0.2  2.0  1.1 1.0 
El  Salvador  1.0  0.2 0.2 1.0  0.2 0.2 0.0 1.1 1.1 
Guatemala  2.0  0.2 0.1 2.0  0.2 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.9 
Honduras 0.0  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.3  2.0 2.1 1.8 
Jamaica  0.0  0.2 0.2 0.0  0.2 0.2 0.0 0.7 0.7 
Mexico  0.0  0.1 0.1 0.0  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 
Nicaragua 1.0  0.2  0.2  1.0  0.3  0.2  3.0 2.6 1.9 
Panama  0.0  0.1 0.1 0.0  0.2 0.1 1.0 0.6 0.5 
Paraguay 1.0  0.1  0.1  1.0  0.2  0.1  3.0 2.1 1.6 
Peru 1.0  0.1  0.1  1.0  0.2  0.1  2.0  1.0 0.7 
Uruguay 0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.1  2.0  0.9 0.6 
Venezuela  0.0  0.1 0.1 0.0  0.1 0.1 1.0 0.6 0.3 
Asia             
India 0.0  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.3  5.0 3.5 3.1 
Indonesia 1.0  0.4  0.4  1.0  0.5  0.5  5.0 4.4 3.9 
Philippines 1.0  0.1  0.1  1.0  0.2  0.1  3.0 2.1 1.5 
South  Korea  0.0  0.1 0.0 0.0  0.1 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.2 
Thailand 1.0  0.1  0.1  1.0  0.2  0.1  3.0  1.4 0.7 
Africa             
Burkina Faso  1.0  0.4  0.4  1.0  0.5  0.5  2.0 3.8 3.7 
Cameroon  1.0  0.2 0.3 1.0  0.3 0.3 1.0 2.5 2.5 
Cape  Verde  1.0  0.1 0.1 1.0  0.1 0.1 0.0 1.3 1.3 
Mauritania 0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.2  4.0 2.7 2.0 
Mozambique 0.0 0.4  0.2  0.0 0.5  0.3  7.0 6.0 4.3 
Rwanda 0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.2  7.0 4.3 2.8 
Sao Tome  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.2  4.0 3.5 2.4 
Senegal 0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.2  2.0 2.0 1.4 
Source: Own elaboration from LSMS household survey data 
Note: All cases showing change of two or more percentage points are highlighted in bold. 
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4.  Utilities Social Policy 
 
The previous sections have highlighted the gap that still remains between residential 
utility tariffs and full cost recovery. Moreover, it has been shown that within Latin 
America, genuine affordability problems appear to be confined to those in the bottom 
quintile of the income distribution, and in the lower income countries that face 
international prices for water and electricity services. These considerations suggest that, 
in principle, it should be possible to reconcile the objective of cost recovery and social 
protection through the application of targeted safety nets for utility services. Social tariff 
schemes for water and electricity, of diverse kinds, are in fact already widespread in Latin 
America. This section reviews the available evidence on the design and performance of 
these social policies, and evaluates the extent to which they contribute towards the 




The analysis of the water sector is based on a detailed review of the tariff structures of 
some 17 major water utilities in eight countries drawn from around the region 
(ADERASA, forthcoming). To complement this general overview, the results of a 
number of detailed evaluations of existing social tariff schemes are also presented. 
 
By far the most commonplace social policy in the water sector is the Increasing Block 
Tariff (IBT) structure, whereby consumers are able to access the first consumption block 
at a concessional rate, and pay increasing prices at the margin for additional blocks of 
consumption. The IBT offers an implicit social safety net in so much as the first block 
should provide all families with access to a subsistence level of consumption at below the 
full economic cost. In theory at least, the IBT should still allow utilities to recover the full 
costs of service provision by charging above cost on higher blocks of consumption. A 
well-designed IBT should therefore incorporate a relatively small first block, that 
genuinely relates to subsistence consumption needs. Thereafter, the gradient between 
marginal tariff and consumption should be steep enough to allow prices to reach cost 
recovery levels within a normal range of consumption. 
 
IBTs are almost universal among the 17 Latin American water utilities surveyed in this 
study. Analysis of these tariff structures suggests that there are a number of common 
problems with their design (Table 9). 
 
First, the size of the subsistence block ranges from 15-40 cubic meters per month, with an 
average value of 25 cubic meters per month. This value is relatively high, both in relation 
to the average residential consumption of 20 cubic meters per month in most of these 
cities, and to benchmark levels of subsistence consumption of 8-16 cubic meters per   24
month.
3 The implication of this is that a very high percentage of total residential 
consumption benefits from these concessional ‘subsistence’ rates. 
 
Table 9: Overview of residential water tariff structures 
  Fixed charges  Block structure 
 
  Min.     
cons. 
Fixed charge 































Arequipa  6 40  4  15  60  0.14  0.51  0.008 ∝ 
Bogota  0 31  3  20  40  0.53  0.69  0.008 ∝ 
Cali  0 40  1  ⎯   0.27  0.27    ∝ 
Cochabamba  12 79  6 25 150  0.15  0.32  0.001  ∝ 
Concepcion  0 15  2  40  40  0.39  0.80    1,000 
Costa Rica  15 100  4 25 60  0.31  0.70  0.011  ∝ 
La Paz  0 0  4  30  300  0.22  1.19  0.004 208 
Lima  0 23  5  20  80  0.26  0.98  0.012 200 
Managua  0 6  2  20  20  0.24  0.54    400 
Medellín  0 32  1  ⎯   0.35  0.35    ∝ 
Panama  38 100  4 30 115  0.36  0.44  0.001  ∝ 
Pernambuco  10 21  5 20 90  0.54  2.00  0.021  40 
Santa Cruz  0 50  10  15  135  0.29  0.73  0.004 ∝ 
Santiago  0 13  2  40  40  0.35  0.87    340 
Sao Paulo  10 30  4 20 50  0.26  1.17  0.030  36 
Trujillo  6 30  3  20  100  0.27  0.69  0.005 ∝ 
Valparaiso  0 9  2  40  40  0.74  1.39    44 
                 
Average  6 36  4  25  88  0.33  0.80     
                
Source: Adapted from ADERASA, forthcoming 
 
Second, the gradient of these tariff structures is generally very flat. As a result, the 
average tariff only reaches levels commensurate with the full average cost of service 
provision (of around US$0.80 per cubic meter) at extremely high rates of consumption 
amounting to several hundred cubic meters per month in most cases. Indeed, in 53% of 
the utilities considered that tariff structure was such that the average tariff never rises to 
the cost recovery benchmark level, however much is consumed. What this means is that 
these IBTs effectively subsidize the totality of residential water use. 
 
Third, around 40% of the utilities analyzed incorporate minimum consumption thresholds 
into their tariff structures. This means that any customer consuming up to the threshold 
level pays the same fixed charge, and volumetric rates are only charged on consumption 
in excess of the threshold. As a result, customers using less than the minimum amount 
face very high average tariffs, with the magnitude of the tariffs being inversely related to 
the level of consumption. Given that the average value of the threshold is 14 cubic meters 
                                                 
3 This estimate is based on a household of five people consuming 50 liters per capita per day that is 
considered to be the minimum requirement to sustain human health, or alternatively 100 liters per capita 
per day equivalent to a modest level of consumption in urban areas.   25
per month, which is to say 70% of the average consumption level, this problem affects a 
significant percentage of consumers. 
 
The whole efficacy of IBT structures as income redistribution mechanisms hinges on the 
hypothesis that water consumption is well correlated with household income. However, 
this hypothesis has rarely been put to an empirical test. Figure 10 summarizes data on 
average water consumption by income quintile for eight Latin American utilities. In two-
thirds of these cases, the variation between the water consumption of the top and bottom 
quintiles of the income distribution is very weak, no more than 20% in all, and in some 
instances the top quintile actually consumes less water than the bottom quintile (Figure 
11). However, in other cases such as Paraguay and Colombia, the top income quintile 
consumes around twice as much as the bottom quintile.  
 
Figure 10: Average monthly water consumption by quintile 































































Figure 11: Index of relative monthly water consumption by quintile 
Source: Own elaboration from LSMS household survey data 
 
There are a number of plausible explanations as to why the relationship between income 
and water consumption might be relatively flat. One is that family sizes tend to be 
inversely related to income.  In Uruguay, for example, bottom quintile households have 
low per capita water consumption (2.6 cubic meters per month) but a large number of 
family members (4.6), whereas top quintile households have high per capita water 
consumption (5.9 cubic meters per month) and a small number of family members (2.3). 
These two trends more or less offset each other leaving household water consumption 
virtually constant across the income distribution in Uruguay. In addition, due to cramped 
living conditions, poor households are more likely to share a single connection between 
several households. 
 
These results indicate that the hypothesized link between income and water consumption 
does not always hold, and is in general much weaker than is commonly assumed. The 
implication is that any IBT structure, however well designed, would not be able to 
redistribute income between rich and poor. Few studies of the distributional performance 
of IBT structures for water are available for the Latin America region. However, Robles 
(2002) shows that the IBT structure based on a 15 cubic meter threshold for Paraguay 
delivers only 20% of subsidy resources to the poor, but that this percentage would rise to 
60% if the subsistence threshold was reduced to 5 cubic meters. A recent study of IBT 
structures in South Asia have found that only 20-30% of subsidies delivered through IBT 
structures are captured by the poor, and that this share would barely improve even if the 
design of the IBT structure were to improve, for example by reducing the subsistence 



















































































In addition, to their reliance on IBT structures, three quarters of utilities in the sample 
also offer a completely separate social tariff scheme for customers meeting certain 
poverty criteria, based either on neighborhood or individual characteristics. In most cases, 
this simply takes the form of a parallel IBT structure offering even more concessional 
terms and financed internally by each utility through cross-subsidy arrangements. These 
social tariff schemes offer an average discount of 67% on what would be paid under the 
normal residential tariff. In Chile, Colombia, Argentina and Paraguay some more 
sophisticated social tariff schemes have developed following a range of different 
practices (Table 10). 
 
Chile introduced a direct subsidy scheme for water in 1990 in order to protect the poorest 
customers from the impact of the doubling of water tariffs needed to restore financial 
sustainability to the sector (Gomez-Lobo and Contreras, 2003). The magnitude of the 
subsidy varies between 15-85% and is set so as to ensure that households do not have to 
spend more than 5% of their income on water. The subsidy is limited to the first 15 cubic 
meters of monthly water consumption. Eligibility is re-assessed every three years, based 
on a multi-dimensional poverty indicator that draws upon information collected in a 
household interview. Administrative costs are shared across a number of social welfare 
programs that are based on the same poverty indicator. The scheme is funded by the 
central government and administered by local municipalities, who transfer the subsidy 
resources directly to the utility contingent on the beneficiaries paying their own share of 
the bill. The Chilean scheme benefits 600,000 people (or around 20% of the population) 
and costs around US$40 million per year. 
 
Colombia has a unique and long-standing cross-subsidy scheme that applies to all 
household utility services and presents a number of distinguishing characteristics. It 
employs a zonal poverty criterion based on a six level social stratification of all 
neighborhoods throughout the country (World Bank, 2004). Households living in lower 
strata neighborhoods are eligible for a certain percentage of subsidy, and this is financed 
by surcharges on the bills of households in higher strata neighborhoods. Both subsidies 
and surcharges are explicitly identified on consumer bills. The scheme is based on a 
principle of national income redistribution, so that utilities with surplus surcharge 
revenues are supposed to transfer them into a fund used to make-up the deficit of other 
utilities that may have few higher strata households in their customer base. Any overall 
shortfalls are supposed to be met by fiscal transfers. However, in practice, none of the 
utilities generate any surplus income, and fiscal transfers made directly to local 
municipalities are not always used to cover the deficit in the subsidy scheme. The 
Colombian scheme is estimated to benefit almost 30 million people (or around 90% of 
the population). As a result, it is very costly amounting to US$250 million per year, of 
which less than US$100 million is funded via internal surcharges.  
 
A number of Argentine provinces, as well as the metropolitan area, have introduced 
social tariff schemes for water (Foster, 2004).  There are currently some 10 different 
schemes in operation. While the details differ, most of these schemes select beneficiaries 
on the basis of multi-dimensional poverty criteria including income, housing 
characteristics, location and assets. Some schemes are financed through internal cross-  28
subsidies (Metropolitan Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Santiago del Estero), while others 
depend on fiscal transfers (Chaco, Mendoza, Salta, Tucuman). Notwithstanding the 
number of schemes, it is estimated that the total number of beneficiaries is less than 
100,000 (less than 1% of the population) and the total cost of these schemes is less than 
US$10m. 
 
In Paraguay, eligibility for the social tariff is assessed on the basis of the characteristics 
of the customer’s dwelling (Robles, 2002). In order to be considered eligible for the 
social tariff scheme households must meet four out of five of the following conditions: 
earth floors, mud or wood walls, straw or zinc roofs, no more than two rooms, no internal 
tap and no sewerage. However, the scale of this scheme is very small affecting no more 
than 5,000 beneficiaries and costing less than US$0.1m. 
 
It is interesting to compare the targeting performance of each of these different schemes. 
Notwithstanding the various selection criteria used, all three schemes present relatively 
high errors of inclusion, meaning that 30-50% of subsidy beneficiaries do not fall below 
the poverty line. As a result, 40-60% of subsidy resources are captured by the non-poor. 
At the same time, the Argentine and Chilean schemes with their tightly defined eligibility 
criteria erroneously exclude 70-80% of the poor from receiving the subsidy. The 
Colombian scheme, on the other hand, being virtually universal in reach excludes only 
1% of those living below the poverty line. Finally, the overall distributional incidence of 
these subsidy schemes is slightly regressive in the Colombian case (given the positive 
value of the concentration coefficient), but reasonably progressive in the Argentine and 
Paraguayan schemes. However, it should be noted that the evaluation of these social 
tariffs is based on simulated rather than observed eligibility and hence is likely to over-
state the targeting performance of these schemes. 
 
To put these results in perspective, it is interesting to compare them to those found in 
other social welfare programs. The Coady statistic takes a value of one for social 
programs that do no better than to allocate resources randomly across the population, 
with no particular bias towards rich or poor. Based on a review of 122 targeted welfare 
programs in 48 countries, Coady and Grosh (2002) find that three quarters of these 
programs score more than one indicating that resources are concentrated towards low 
income household. However, the median score was 1.25 indicating that the program 
allocates 25% more resources towards poor households than would a random allocation 
of resources. These authors set a benchmark level of 1.50 for a well functioning targeted 
welfare program. Thus, the Chilean water subsidy scheme performs better than the 
typical targeted welfare program and falls just short  of the best practice benchmark. 
However, the Colombian cross-subsidy scheme performs worse than typical welfare 
programs and is only slightly better than a random allocation of resources, while the 
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Table 10: Comparative overview of water subsidy schemes  
  Argentina Chile  Colombia  Paraguay 
Design       

















15-85% 30-70%  30% 
Administration  Local government   
or local utility 
Local 
government 
Local              
utility 
Local        
utility 













Total cost  










Performance       
Error of inclusion  44%  32%  51%  26% 
Error of exclusion         
• Connected poor  73% 89%  1%  82% 
• All poor  76% 96%  13% 89% 
Leakage rate    44%  56%  61% 
Coady statistic    1.40  1.10  0.97 
Concentration 
coefficient 
-0.15   +0.11 -0.39 




The analysis of the electricity sector is based on a detailed review of the tariff structures 
of some 44 major electric utilities in fourteen countries drawn from around the region 
(CIER, 2003). Since tariff designs are relatively homogeneous within countries, the 
discussion will be based on average or modal characteristics at the country level. To 
complement this general overview, the results of a number of detailed evaluations of 
existing social tariff schemes are also presented. 
 
In contrast to the water sector, there is a much greater variety of tariff structures in use in 
the electricity sector (Table 11). Six of the countries surveyed rely primarily on linear 
tariff schedules for residential customers, while the remaining eight use IBT structures. 
The three utilities serving Buenos Aires (Argentina) stand out as being the only ones that 
offer a declining block structure such that the average tariff for residential customers 
declines as consumption increases. Residential tariff structures are almost always based 
solely on volumetric considerations, with Chile and Uruguay being the only countries 
that apply time sensitive and load based charging systems to residential customers. 
 
Nine of the countries in the sample offer parallel social tariff schemes, and the vast 
majority of these are based on IBT structures, even when the main residential tariff is   30
linear (see, for example, Brazil and Colombia). Eligibility for social tariffs is usually 
confined to households consuming below a certain limit that ranges from 75 kilowatt-
hours per month (Paraguay) to 500 kilowatt-hours per month (Venezuela) and takes an 
average value of around 200 kilowatt-hours. In a handful of cases additional eligibility 
criteria are applied based on household characteristics (some Argentine provinces), 
neighborhood characteristics (Colombia), or whether the family is a beneficiary of other 
welfare programs (Brazil). The average discount provided to beneficiaries of the social 
tariff is equivalent to around 40% on a monthly bill of 100 kilowatt-hours. 
 
Table 11: Overview of tariff structures for residential electricity 


















Argentina DBT/IBT      IBT  100-200  9  -50 
Brazil Linear      IBT 100-200  9  -50 
Chile Linear  9  9        
Colombia Linear      IBT  200  9  -50 
Ecuador  IBT     IBT 130    -16 
El  Salvador  Linear     Linear 200    -3 
Honduras  IBT     IBT 500    -3 
Guatemala  Linear     Linear 300    -45 
Mexico IBT             
Nicaragua IBT             
Paraguay  IBT     IBT 75    -55 
Peru IBT           
Uruguay IBT/Linear  9  9        
Venezuela  IBT     IBT 200    -85 
Source: CIER, 2003 
 
It is interesting to examine the design of the IBT tariff structures in more detail, and 
examine to what extent they repeat some of the design errors that were observed in the 
IBT structures used in the water sector (Table 12).  
 
First, the size of the subsistence block ranges from 25 to 300 kilowatt-hours per month, 
with an average value of around 90 kilowatt-hours per month. Based on patterns of 
appliance ownership and use in Latin America, a subsistence consumption threshold for 
rural households is generally thought to lie around 40 kilowatt-hours per month (which is 
sufficient for a few light bulbs and a radio), while the equivalent threshold in urban areas 
is probably closer to 120 kilowatt-hours (which supports a few light bulbs, a small 
refrigerator and a modest television). In this sense, the average value of 90 kilowatt-hours 
per month does not appear unreasonable, although thresholds of 200-300 kilowatt-hours 
per month as practiced in Colombia and Venezuela are probably excessive. 
 
Second, the gradients  of the IBT structures for electricity tend to be steeper for electricity 
than those observed for water. As a result, in nearly half of the cases considered the 
average tariff reaches cost recovery levels well within the typical consumption range of a 
residential household. This can be compared with only 18% of the cases considered in the 
water sector. 
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Third, both the prevalence and level of fixed charges is much lower in electricity tariff 
structures than was the case for water. Whereas 94% of the water utilities surveyed have 
fixed charges, and 40% apply minimum consumption thresholds, only 68% of the electric 
utilities surveyed have fixed charges, and only 11% apply minimum consumption 
thresholds. Moreover, the average value of the fixed charge in the case of electricity is 
US$0.66 per month, compared to US$2.66 per month for the water sector. Thus, fixed 
charges on average represent about 20% of a typical household electricity bill, versus 
almost 40% in the water sector. 
 
Thus, overall, the results suggest that IBT structures for electricity are in general much 
better designed than is the case for water. Furthermore, the correlation between electricity 
consumption and household income is somewhat stronger in the case of electricity than 
was found for the case of water (Figure 12). Thus, households in the top income quintile 
tend to consume 160% more electricity than households in the bottom income quintile, 
compared with 30% more water, although the variation between the bottom quintile and 
the middle quintiles is much less pronounced (Figure 13). This suggests that IBT 
structures in electricity have greater potential to redistribute income than IBT structures 
in water, to the extent that they are appropriately designed. 
 
Table 12: Overview of IBT structures for residential electricity 
  Fixed charges  Block structure 
 
  Min.     
cons. 
Fixed charge 






















  kWh/m %  N  kWh/m kWh/m  US$/kWh US$/kWh US$/kWh  kWh/m 
Brazil 0 0  3  30  125  0.025 0.070 0.0005  ∝ 
Colombia 0  0  2  200  200  0.046  0.069    ∝ 
Ecuador 0  20  6  50  300  0.076  0.112  0.0001 550 
Honduras 20  50  3  100  300  0.047  0.079  0.0002  1 
Mexico 0  18  3 50 100  0.112  0.149  0.0007 1 
Nicaragua 0  0  6  25  1000  0.044  0.257  0.0002  75 
Paraguay 0  0  3  50  150  0.053  0.063  0.0001  ∝ 
Peru 0  6  3  30  100  0.072  0.099  0.0004  30 
Venezuela  100 100  3  300 500  0.057  0.070  0.0001  ∝ 
                 
Average  13 22  4 93 308  0.059  0.108  0.0003  
                   
Source: Adapted from Appendix 3 
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Figure 12: Average monthly electricity consumption by quintile 
 
Source: Own elaboration from LSMS household survey data 
 
 
Figure 13: Index of relative monthly electricity consumption by quintile 






































































































































Nevertheless, good targeting performance is by no means guaranteed. Table 13 reports 
performance data on two social tariff schemes in Guatemala and Honduras that use 
electricity consumption levels as their sole eligibility criterion (Foster and Araujo, 2003; 
Wodon, Ajwad and Siaens, 2000). However, in both cases the consumption threshold is 
300 kilowatt-hours, compared with average household electricity consumption of 102 
kilowatt-hours per month in Guatemala and 108 kilowatt-hours per month in Honduras. 
Thus, 95% of Guatemalan households and 85% of Honduran households are eligible for 
the social tariff, so that 60-65% of subsidy beneficiaries are not poor, and 80-90% of 
subsidy resources are captured by the non-poor. Moreover, only around 50% of poor 
households in Guatemala and Honduras have an electricity connection, and consequently 
55-60% of the poor fail to benefit from the social tariff. As a result, both these subsidy 
schemes are highly regressive and deliver much lower subsidies to the poor than could be 
achieved via a random allocation of money across the population. 
 
Table 13: Comparative overview of electricity subsidy schemes  
  Argentina Colombia  Guatemala  Honduras 
Design        
Consumption limit  100-200kWh/m  200kWh/m 
 
300kWh/m 300kWh/m 






Consumption   
level 
Consumption           
level 
Discount 25-75% 10-25% 
 
30-50% 50% 
Administration Local  government, 
and local utility 
Local              
utility 
















Total cost  









Performance        
Error of inclusion  39%  51%  65%  60% 
Error of exclusion         
• Connected poor  93% 2%  0%  9% 
• All poor  94% 6%  60%  55% 
Leakage rate    69%  90%  81% 
Coady statistic    1.03  0.25  0.48 
Concentration 
coefficient 
-0.37 +0.02  +0.50   
Source: Wodon, Ajwad and Siaens, 2000; Foster and Araujo, 2003; Foster, 2004; World Bank, 2004 
 
It is interesting to compare this performance against two other social tariff schemes that 
employ additional eligibility criteria, over and above the level of electricity consumption. 
Two examples are give. The first is the Colombian cross-subsidy scheme, which is based 
on geographical eligibility, and is virtually identical to the water cross-subsidy scheme 
already described above. The other is the social tariff scheme practiced in a number of 
Argentine provinces, based on the socio-economic characteristics of the household, and 
similar to those already described above for the water sector. Both of these schemes   34
appear to perform somewhat better than the consumption based social tariffs in Central 
America. Both schemes have lower errors of inclusion and a less regressive distributional 
impact. However, the Argentine provincial social tariff schemes perform significantly 
better than the Colombian cross-subsidy system, albeit with very high errors of exclusion 
reflecting their modest scale. 
 
Regarding comparisons with other social programs, the Coady statistic shows that the 
Colombia, Guatemalan and Honduran schemes all perform well below the median level 
of 1.25 for targeted welfare programs, and even further below the benchmark level of 
1.50 for well-functioning programs. Unfortunately, the Coady statistic for the Argentine 
scheme could not be computed from the available data. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
During the 1990s, most Latin American countries passed legislation committing 
themselves to raise water and electricity tariffs towards cost recovery levels. Although 
nominal water and electricity tariffs increased quite substantially, the combined effects of 
price inflation and currency depreciation have offset these gains to a considerable degree. 
Nevertheless, water and electricity tariffs in Latin America remain much closer to cost 
recovery levels than those found in other developing regions of the world, and are above 
the average for upper-middle-income countries. However, average residential water 
tariffs in Latin America at US$0.41 per cubic meter are still barely 40% of OECD levels, 
while average electricity tariffs at US$0.09 per kilowatt-hour are around 75% of OECD 
levels. 
 
Overall, the electricity sector is much closer to cost recovery than the water sector. Thus, 
while 85% of countries (and 69% of low-income countries) achieve some degree of cost 
recovery for electricity, only 60% of utilities (and 12% of low-income utilities) achieve 
some degree of cost recovery for water. Indeed, even in OECD countries, only around 
50% of water utilities seem to be recovering some degree of capital costs. Moreover, 
average tariffs for electricity in high-income countries are around twice as high as those 
in low-income countries, while average tariffs for water in high-income countries are 
around nine times as high as those in low-income countries. 
 
One of the most commonly cited obstacles to cost recovery tariffs is the problem of 
affordability of basic utility services by residential households, and low-income families 
in particular. However, a careful analysis of income distribution in the region suggests 
that only about 20% of Latin American households would have to pay more than 5% of 
their income for water or electricity services if tariffs were set at cost recovery levels. 
However, in the region’s lower-income countries (Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Paraguay), reaching cost recovery tariffs would represent a significant affordability 
problem for around half of the population. Even in cases where tariffs might have to 
double to reach cost recovery levels, the overall impact on poverty levels in Latin 
America would be negligible. 
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These results can be compared to those for India and Africa where around 70% of 
households could be expected to face difficulties in paying full cost recovery tariffs. In 
these regions, tariffs would likely have to increase by a factor of ten to reach cost 
recovery levels, and this could be expected to have a significant impact on poverty. 
Nevertheless, across all regions, the extent of the affordability problem reduces 
substantially when incomes are measured in purchasing power parity terms, as may be 
more appropriate in the case of larger middle-income countries.   
 
Given the relatively small segment of the population that faces genuine affordability 
problems in Latin America, there appears to be a promising case for using targeted 
subsidies to reconcile the cost recovery objective with social protection concerns. Social 
tariff schemes of various kinds are indeed already widespread in Latin America, however 
they suffer from a number of design flaws.  IBT structures are the most prevalent form of 
social tariffs in the region. These are likely to be more successful in the electricity sector 
than in the water sector due to the fact that the correlation between consumption and 
income is much stronger in the case of electricity than water. Moreover, IBT structures in 
electricity tend to be much better designed than in the case of water, with lower fixed 
charges, lower subsistence blocks, and steeper gradients. A number of more sophisticated 
social tariff schemes are also being applied that combine consumption criteria with some 
form of socio-economic screening. These are generally found to perform better than 
IBTs, however they also present significant room for improvement. 
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Appendix 1 
Implications of Real Exchange Rate Movements 
 
The real exchange rate aims to measure movements in the relative real purchasing power 
of two currencies. Thus the real exchange rate (R) is defined as the nominal exchange rate 

























An extensive literature has documented real exchange rate movements in Latin America 
in recent decades (Edwards, 1998; Athukorala, 2003; Mejía-Reyes et al., 2004). The 
findings are that in many Latin American countries real exchange rates depreciated 
substantially following the debt crisis on the early 1980s, only to experience substantial 
appreciations up to the currency crises of 1997, and returning to a pattern of depreciation 
thereafter in a number of countries 
 
Consequently, tariff increases measured in real US dollar terms will tend to be smaller 
than those measured in local currency terms for countries experiencing real exchange rate 
depreciation over the relevant period, and conversely for countries experiencing real 
exchange rate appreciation. In extreme cases, tariff trends in real US dollar terms may 
even be negative even if the same trends measured in real local currency terms are 
positive. This would happen for example if there is an increase in relative prices between 
the respective country and the US that more than offsets the declining value of that 
country’s exchange rate. The opposite situation may also arise. 
 
This phenomenon can be observed in Section 2 of the paper real tariff trends for water 
and electricity services are analyzed both in local currency and US dollar terms. In some 
cases (for example Bolivia and Brazil), real water tariffs are reported as rising in real 
local currency terms but falling in real dollar terms. This is due to real currency 
depreciations that took place in these countries over the period 1997/03 considered for 
the water tariff analysis. Similarly, in other cases (for example Paraguay and Uruguay), 
real electricity tariffs are reported as rising in local currency terms but falling in real 
dollar terms. Once again, this is due to real currency depreciations that took place in these 
countries over the period 1990/02 considered for the electricity tariff analysis. 
 
The table below summarizes real exchange rate movements in all of the Latin America 
countries considered in this paper, over the time periods 1997/03 (used in the water sector 
analysis) and 1990/02 (used in the electricity sector analysis).   39
 
  Real Exchange Rate Movement 1997/03  Real Exchange Rate Movement 1990/02 
  1997 2003 Change  Outcome  1990 2002 Change  Outcome 
Argentina  1.00 2.30 -1.30  Dep  0.49 1.15 -0.66  Dep 
Bolivia  5.25 6.62 -1.36  Dep  3.17 3.82 -0.65  Dep 
Brazil  1.08 2.12 -1.04  Dep  0.00 0.02 -0.02  Dep 
Chile  419.30 561.33 -142.03  Dep  304.90 346.37 -41.47 Dep 
Colombia  1140.45 1839.77 -699.32  Dep  502.26  424.21  78.05  App 
Costa  Rica  232.60 248.03 -15.43  Dep  91.54  68.74  22.80  App 
Dominican  R.  14.27 19.62 -5.35  Dep  8.53  6.87  1.66  App 
Ecuador  1.00 1.07 -0.07  Dep  1.00 0.71 0.29 App 
El  Salvador  8.75 8.69 0.06  App  7.59 5.33 2.26 App 
Guatemala 6.06 5.82 0.24  App  4.49 2.96 1.53 App 
Honduras  13.00 11.21 1.79  App  4.11  3.53  0.59  App 
Jamaica  35.40 36.59 -1.18  Dep  7.18  5.94  1.25  App 
Mexico  7.92 6.64 1.28  App  2.81 2.06 0.75 App 
Nicaragua  9.45 6.73 2.72  App  0.15 0.08 0.08 App 
Panama  1.00 1.02 -0.02  Dep  1.00 0.92 0.08 App 
Paraguay  2178.00 4069.66 -1891.66  Dep  1229.80 1806.12 -576.32 Dep 
Peru  2.66 3.21 -0.55  Dep  0.21 0.19 0.02 App 
Uruguay 9.44  17.88  -8.44  Dep  1.17  1.31  -0.14  Dep 
Venezuela  488.63 466.85 21.79  App  46.90  35.37  11.53  App 
United  States  1.00 1.00 0.00  App  1.00 1.00 0.00 App   40
Appendix 2 
Methodology for Analyzing Household Income Distribution 
 
 
Determination of income shares. Data collected from recent household surveys was 
used to calculate the percentage of total household income (expenditure), that accrues to 
the urban (SU) or rural (SR) sectors of the economy. In addition, the share captured by 
each percentile x of the urban income (expenditure) distribution is also calculated (Sx)  
 
Calculation of standardization of absolute income. In order to have a standardized 
dollar measure of the income available to each percentile of the income (expenditure) 
distribution in each country, the national accounts were used to provide a 
methodologically consistent dollar aggregate. The Gross National Income, GNI, was used 
to provide the aggregate income, while the Final Consumption Expenditure, FCE, was 
used to provide the aggregate expenditure. The total dollar income available to each 
percentile of the urban income distribution is found by applying SU and Sx to the GNI 
(FCE) aggregate. The average dollar income available to each household in each 
percentile of the urban income distribution (Ix) is then found by dividing this value 
among the total number of households in each percentile of the urban income distribution 













xGNI S x S
I  
 
Current versus international dollars. Two different versions of this exercise are 
performed. In the first, the Gross National Income (or Final Consumption Expenditure) 
values are expressed in current US dollars, as is appropriate for analysis of affordability 
of tradable goods. In the second version, the Gross National Income (or Final 
Consumption Expenditure) values are expressed in international dollars on a Purchasing 
Power Parity basis, as is appropriate for analysis of affordability of non-tradable goods. 
In order to produce the PPP estimates, Gross National Income (or Final Consumption 
Expenditure) are adjusted by multipliers based on the ratio between Gross Domestic 















x GNI GNI  
 
National versus regional analysis. This whole exercise can be done either at a national 
level or at an aggregate regional level. In order to produce regional estimates, the 
percentile shares of all countries in the region are pooled and ordered by income (or 
expenditure) level. The same statistics are then calculated using population weights to 
take into account the different sizes of percentiles across countries. 
 
Poverty impact analysis. To calculate the impact of raising utility prices on the 
incidence of poverty a Laspeyres price index is used to capture the weighted average   41
increase in prices, P, experienced by each household. The index is weighted based on the 
initial expenditure shares assigned to utilities, SU, versus other goods, SNU. Prices of non-
utility goods, NU, are assumed to remain constant. The Laspeyres index provides a 
deflator that is used to scale down the value of household income to reflect its lower 
purchasing power. Poverty indices are then recalculated based on the deflated vector of 
incomes, using the original average income of the households in the 40
th percentile of the 
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